Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria /
This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome thes...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
1991.
|
| Edition: | 2. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts. |
|---|---|
| Item Description: | Electronic resource. |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xix, 339 pages 105 illustrations) |
| ISBN: | 9783642582424 (electronic bk.) 3642582427 (electronic bk.) |