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Rings in auctions : an experimental approach /

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This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Artale, Angelo, 1969-
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin ; New York : Springer, [1997]
Series:Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 447.
Subjects:
Auctions > Mathematical models.
Economics, Mathematical.
Game theory.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Contents: Introduction. The Experiment: Introduction and Related Literature
  • Experimental Design
  • Theory of Collusion in First-price Auctions
  • Experimental Results
  • Theoretical Predictions versus Data
  • Other Mechanisms
  • Strategic Behavior and the End Effect. A Descriptive Model: Conditional Probabilities
  • The Model. Mechanisms of Collusion: The Distribution Function
  • Announcement Mechanism
  • Bid-bargain Mechanism
  • Lattice Mechanism
  • First-price Auction Mechanism
  • Summing Up. Two Extensions: Latice with Continuous Bids
  • Two-player Coalition. Conclusion.