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Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information : an experimental study /

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The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ryll, Wolfgang, 1965-
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin ; New York : Springer, [1996]
Series:Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 440.
Subjects:
Dispute resolution (Law) > Psychological aspects.
Compromise (Law) > Psychological aspects.
Actions and defenses > Psychological aspects.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Contents: Introduction
  • The Game-Teoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets
  • Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment
  • Experimental Results
  • Learning Theories
  • Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of the Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory
  • Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory
  • Summary.