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Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information
1 online resource (viii, 174 pages) : illustrations
The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.
Contents: Introduction -- The Game-Teoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets -- Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment -- Experimental Results -- Learning Theories -- Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of the Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory -- Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory -- Summary.
Includes bibliographical references (pages [171]-174).
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 440