Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information : an experimental study /
The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin ; New York :
Springer,
[1996]
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| Series: | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ;
440. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game. |
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| Item Description: | Electronic resource. |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (viii, 174 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages [171]-174). |
| ISBN: | 9783642614675 (electronic bk.) 3642614671 (electronic bk.) |