Game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups /

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of i...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Sloof, Randolph
Corporate Author:	SpringerLink (Online service)
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Boston : Kluwer Academic, [1998]
Subjects:	Pressure groups > Mathematical models. Game theory. Politieke besluitvorming. Politieke invloed. Belangengroepen. Speltheorie. Groupes de pression > Modèles mathématiques. Jeux, Théorie des. Lobbying > Modèles mathématiques. Grupos de pressão. Teoria dos jogos. Interessenverband. Electronic books.
Online Access:	Connect to the full text of this electronic book

Table of Contents:

Motivation
Review of the Literature
The political influence of interest groups: empirical evidence
The political influence of interest groups: theoretical models
Game-Theoretic Preliminaries
A basic signaling game
The three ways in which the basic signaling game will be applied
Extensions of the basic signaling game
Campaign Contributions or Direct Endorsements?
Campaign expenditures, direct endorsements and voting
Campaign contributions and voting
Campaign contributions versus direct endorsements
Directly observable contributions
Lobbying or Pressure?
Description of the general model
The AL game: pressure as a means to build up reputation
The LA game: lobbying and the maintenance of reputation
The LL game: reputation building when repeated lobbying is possible
Welfare comparison and institutional design
Lobbying Politicians or Bureaucrats?
Description of the model and its relationship to recent delegation studies
Equilibrium analysis
Generalizations and alternative modeling assumptions
Evaluation.