rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: I am you
    sub title: the metaphysical foundations for global ethics
  name:
    name part: Kolak, Daniel.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: SpringerLink (Online service)
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: ne
    date issued: 2004
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    reformatting quality: access
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource (xxii, 644 pages)
  abstract: Borders enclose and separate us. We assign to them tremendous significance. Along them we draw supposedly uncrossable boundaries within which we believe our individual identities begin and end, erecting the metaphysical dividing walls that enclose each one of us into numerically identical, numerically distinct, entities: persons. Do the borders between usphysical, psychological, neurological, causal, spatial, temporal, etc.merit the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded them? The central thesis of I Am You is that our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. We are all the same person. Variations on this heretical theme have been voiced periodically throughout the ages (the Upanishads, Averros, Giordano Bruno, Josiah Royce, Schrdinger, Fred Hoyle, Freeman Dyson). In presenting his arguments, the author relies on detailed analyses of recent formal work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, David Wiggins, Daniel C. Dennett and Thomas Nagel, while incorporating the views of Descartes, Leibniz, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Husserl and Brouwer. His development of the implied moral theory is inspired by, and draws on, Rawls, Sidgwick, Kant and again Parfit. The traditional, commonsense view that we are each a separate person numerically identical to ourselves over time, i.e., that personal identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borderswhat the author calls Closed Individualismis shown to be incoherent. The demonstration that personal identity is not closed but open points collectively in one of two new directions: either there are no continuously existing, self-identical persons over time in the sense ordinarily understoodthe sort of view developed by philosophers as diverse as Buddha, Hume and most recently Derek Parfit, what the author calls Empty Individualismor else you are everyone, i.e., personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders, wha…
  table of contents: Preliminary Acknowledgments -- Personal Borders -- Border Control -- Physiological Borders -- Neurological Borders -- Spatial Borders -- Psychological Borders -- Causal Borders -- Metaphysical Borders -- Identity Borders -- Phenomenological Borders -- Transcendental Borders -- Moral Borders -- Appendix A: Logical Borders -- Appendix B: Semiotic Borders -- References. Index (names and subjects).
  note: by Daniel Kolak.
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 622-632) and index.
  subject:
    topic: Identity (Philosophical concept)
  subject:
    topic: Self
  subject:
    topic: Identity (Philosophical concept)
  subject:
    topic: Self
  classification: BC199.I4 K65 2004eb
  classification: 170
  related item:
    title info:
      title: I am you : the metaphysical foundations for global ethics
    identifier: (OCoLC)60329674
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Synthese library ; v. 325
  identifier: 1402030142 (electronic bk.)
  identifier: 9781402030147 (electronic bk.)
  identifier: 1402029993
  identifier: 9781402029998
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: YNG
    record creation date: 080618
    record change date: 20260422220215.0
    record identifier: in00003512195
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng