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Computational aspects of cooperative game theory /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chalkiadakis, Georgios
Other Authors: Elkind, Edith, 1976-, Wooldridge, Michael J., 1966-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: [San Rafael, Calif.] : Morgan & Claypool Publishers, [2012]
Series:Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning ; #16.
Subjects:
Game theory > Data processing.
MATHEMATICS / Game Theory.
game theory
cooperative games
coalitional games
representations
computational complexity
solution concepts
core
Shapley value
coalition formation
coalition structure generation
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Summary of key notation
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Why are non-cooperative games non-cooperative?
  • 1.2 Computational problems in game theory
  • 1.3 The remainder of this book
  • 1.4 Further reading
  • 2. Basic concepts
  • 2.1 Characteristic function games
  • 2.1.1 Outcomes
  • 2.1.2 Subclasses of characteristic function games
  • 2.2 Solution concepts
  • 2.2.1 Shapley value
  • 2.2.2 Banzhaf index
  • 2.2.3 Core and core-related concepts
  • 2.2.4 Nucleolus
  • 2.2.5 Kernel
  • 2.2.6 Bargaining set
  • 2.2.7 Stable set
  • 3. Representations and algorithms
  • 3.1 Combinatorial optimization games
  • 3.1.1 Induced subgraph games
  • 3.1.2 Network flow games
  • 3.1.3 Assignment and matching games
  • 3.1.4 Minimum cost spanning tree games
  • 3.1.5 Facility location games
  • 3.2 Complete representations
  • 3.2.1 Marginal contribution nets
  • 3.2.2 Synergy coalition groups
  • 3.2.3 Skill-based representations
  • 3.2.4 Algebraic decision diagrams
  • 3.3 Oracle representation
  • 4. Weighted voting games
  • 4.1 Definition and examples
  • 4.2 Dummies and veto players
  • 4.2.1 Power and weight
  • 4.2.2 Computing the power indices
  • 4.2.3 Paradoxes of power
  • 4.3 Stability in weighted voting games
  • 4.3.1 The least core, the cost of stability, and the nucleolus
  • 4.4 Vector weighted voting games
  • 4.4.1 Computing the dimension of a simple game
  • 5. Beyond characteristic function games
  • 5.1 Non-transferable utility games
  • 5.1.1 Formal model
  • 5.1.2 Hedonic games
  • 5.1.3 Qualitative games
  • 5.2 Partition function games
  • 6. Coalition structure formation
  • 6.1 Coalition structure generation
  • 6.1.1 Dynamic programming
  • 6.1.2 Anytime algorithms
  • 6.2 Coalition formation by selfish rational agents
  • 6.2.1 Coalition formation via bargaining
  • 6.2.2 Dynamic coalition formation
  • 6.2.3 Coalition formation under uncertainty
  • 6.3 Coalition formation and learning
  • 7. Advanced topics
  • 7.1 Links between cooperative and non-cooperative games
  • 7.1.1 Cooperation in normal-form games
  • 7.1.2 Non-cooperative justifications of cooperative solution concepts
  • 7.1.3 Program equilibrium
  • 7.2 Using mechanism design for coalition formation
  • 7.2.1 Anonymity-proof solution concepts
  • 7.3 Overlapping and fuzzy coalition formation
  • 7.4 Logical approaches to cooperative game theory
  • 7.5 Applications
  • 7.5.1 Coalitions in communication networks
  • 7.5.2 Coalitions in the electricity grid
  • 7.5.3 Core-selecting auctions
  • 7.6 Research directions
  • Bibliography
  • Authors' biographies
  • Index.