rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Computational aspects of cooperative game theory
  name:
    name part: Chalkiadakis, Georgios.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Elkind, Edith
    name part: 1976-
  name:
    name part: Wooldridge, Michael J.
    name part: 1966-
  type of resource: text
  genre: abstract or summary
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: cau
    date issued: 2012
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource (xii, 150 pages) : illustrations
  abstract: Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
  table of contents: Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Summary of key notation --
  table of contents: 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Why are non-cooperative games non-cooperative? -- 1.2 Computational problems in game theory -- 1.3 The remainder of this book -- 1.4 Further reading --
  table of contents: 2. Basic concepts -- 2.1 Characteristic function games -- 2.1.1 Outcomes -- 2.1.2 Subclasses of characteristic function games -- 2.2 Solution concepts -- 2.2.1 Shapley value -- 2.2.2 Banzhaf index -- 2.2.3 Core and core-related concepts -- 2.2.4 Nucleolus -- 2.2.5 Kernel -- 2.2.6 Bargaining set -- 2.2.7 Stable set --
  table of contents: 3. Representations and algorithms -- 3.1 Combinatorial optimization games -- 3.1.1 Induced subgraph games -- 3.1.2 Network flow games -- 3.1.3 Assignment and matching games -- 3.1.4 Minimum cost spanning tree games -- 3.1.5 Facility location games -- 3.2 Complete representations -- 3.2.1 Marginal contribution nets -- 3.2.2 Synergy coalition groups -- 3.2.3 Skill-based representations -- 3.2.4 Algebraic decision diagrams -- 3.3 Oracle representation --
  table of contents: 4. Weighted voting games -- 4.1 Definition and examples -- 4.2 Dummies and veto players -- 4.2.1 Power and weight -- 4.2.2 Computing the power indices -- 4.2.3 Paradoxes of power -- 4.3 Stability in weighted voting games -- 4.3.1 The least core, the cost of stability, and the nucleolus -- 4.4 Vector weighted voting games -- 4.4.1 Computing the dimension of a simple game --
  table of contents: 5. Beyond characteristic function games -- 5.1 Non-transferable utility games -- 5.1.1 Formal model -- 5.1.2 Hedonic games -- 5.1.3 Qualitative games -- 5.2 Partition function games --
  table of contents: 6. Coalition structure formation -- 6.1 Coalition structure generation -- 6.1.1 Dynamic programming -- 6.1.2 Anytime algorithms -- 6.2 Coalition formation by selfish rational agents -- 6.2.1 Coalition formation via bargaining -- 6.2.2 Dynamic coalition formation -- 6.2.3 Coalition formation under uncertainty -- 6.3 Coalition formation and learning --
  table of contents: 7. Advanced topics -- 7.1 Links between cooperative and non-cooperative games -- 7.1.1 Cooperation in normal-form games -- 7.1.2 Non-cooperative justifications of cooperative solution concepts -- 7.1.3 Program equilibrium -- 7.2 Using mechanism design for coalition formation -- 7.2.1 Anonymity-proof solution concepts -- 7.3 Overlapping and fuzzy coalition formation -- 7.4 Logical approaches to cooperative game theory -- 7.5 Applications -- 7.5.1 Coalitions in communication networks -- 7.5.2 Coalitions in the electricity grid -- 7.5.3 Core-selecting auctions -- 7.6 Research directions --
  table of contents: Bibliography -- Authors' biographies -- Index.
  target audience: specialized
  note: Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge.
  note: Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
  note: Series from website.
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Compendex
  note: INSPEC
  note: Google scholar
  note: Google book search
  note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-143) and index.
  subject:
    topic: Game theory
    topic: Data processing
  subject:
    topic: MATHEMATICS / Game Theory
  subject:
    topic: game theory
  subject:
    topic: cooperative games
  subject:
    topic: coalitional games
  subject:
    topic: representations
  subject:
    topic: computational complexity
  subject:
    topic: solution concepts
  subject:
    topic: core
  subject:
    topic: Shapley value
  subject:
    topic: coalition formation
  subject:
    topic: coalition structure generation
  classification: QA269
  classification: QA269 .C423 2012
  classification: 519.3
  related item:
    note: Compendex
  related item:
    note: INSPEC
  related item:
    note: Google scholar
  related item:
    note: Google book search
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Computational aspects of cooperative game theory
    name:
      name part: Chalkiadakis, Georgios.
    origin info:
      publisher: [San Rafael, Calif.] : Morgan & Claypool Publishers, c2012
    identifier: (OCoLC)759909999
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning ; #16
  identifier: 9781608456536 (electronic bk.)
  identifier: 1608456536 (electronic bk.)
  identifier: 9781608456529 (pbk.)
  identifier: 1608456528 (pbk.)
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: WAU
    record creation date: 111102
    record change date: 20190331170728.0
    record identifier: in00002786270