rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Essays on energy and regulatory compliance
  name:
    name part: Cancho Diez, Cesar.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Puller, Steven L.
    role:
      role term: thesis advisor.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: txu
    date issued: 2012
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource.
  abstract: This dissertation contains two essays on the analysis of market imperfections. In the first essay, I empirically test whether in a three-level hierarchy with asymmetries of information, more competition among intermediaries leads to more deception against the principal. In this setting, intermediaries supervise agents by delegation of the principal, and compete among themselves to provide supervision services to the agents. They cannot be perfectly monitored, therefore allowing them to manipulate supervision results in favor of the agents, and potentially leading to less than optimal outcomes for the principal. Using inspection-level data from the vehicular inspection program in Atlanta, I test for the existence of inspection deception (false positives), and whether this incidence is a function of the number of local competitors by station. I estimate the incidence of the most common form of false positives (clean piping) to be 9% of the passing inspections during the sample period. Moreover, the incidence of clean piping -- passing results of a different vehicle fraudulently applied to a failing vehicle -- per station increases by 0.7% with one more competitor within a 0.5 mile radius. These results are consistent with the presence of more competitors exacerbating the perverse incentives introduced by competition under this setting. In the second essay, we test whether electricity consumption by industrial and commercial customers responds to real-time prices after these firms sign-up for prices linked to the electricity wholesale market price. In principle, time-varying prices (TVP) can mitigate market power in wholesale markets and promote the integration of intermittent generation sources such as wind and solar power. However, little is known about the prevalence of TVP, especially in deregulated retail markets where customers can choose whether to adopt TVP, and how these firms change their consumption after signing up for this type of tariff. We study firm-lev…
  note: "Major Subject: Economics"
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Doctor of Philosophy Texas A&M University 2012 http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2012-08-11512
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  note: Text (Dissertation)
  subject:
    topic: Major Economics
  subject:
    topic: ERCOT
  subject:
    topic: Electricity
  subject:
    topic: Local Competition
  subject:
    topic: Clean Piping
  subject:
    topic: Vehicular Emission Inspections
  subject:
    topic: Texas.
  subject:
    topic: Fraud
  subject:
    topic: Time-varying prices
  identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2012-08-11512
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 121126
    record change date: 20150922150037.0
    record identifier: in00002784511