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Network games : theory, models, and dynamics /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Menache, Ishai
Other Authors: Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: [San Rafael, Calif.] : Morgan & Claypool, [2011]
Series:Synthesis lectures on communication networks (Online) ; #9.
Subjects:
Game theory.
Games > Computer network resources.
Computer networks > Design and construction.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Part I. Game theory background
  • -
  • 1. Static games and solution concepts
  • Strategic form games
  • Solution concepts
  • Dominant and dominated strategies
  • Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Correlated equilibrium
  • Existence of a Nash equilibrium
  • Games with finite pure strategy sets
  • Games with infinite pure strategy sets
  • Continuous games
  • Discontinuous games
  • Uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
  • Appendix: metric spaces and probability measures
  • Appendix: nonlinear optimization
  • -
  • 2. Game theory dynamics
  • Extensive form games
  • Learning dynamics in games: fictitious play
  • Convergence of fictitious play
  • Non-convergence of fictitious play
  • Convergence proofs
  • Games with special structure
  • Supermodular games
  • Potential games
  • Appendix: lattices
  • -
  • Part II. Network games
  • -
  • 3. Wireline network games
  • Selfish routing, Wardrop equilibrium and efficiency
  • Routing model
  • Wardrop equilibrium
  • Inefficiency of the equilibrium
  • Multiple origin-destination pairs
  • Partially optimal routing
  • Background and motivation
  • The model
  • Efficiency of partially optimal routing
  • Extensions
  • Congestion and provider price competition
  • Pricing and efficiency with congestion externalities
  • Model
  • Monopoly pricing and equilibrium
  • Oligopoly pricing and equilibrium
  • Efficiency analysis
  • Extensions
  • Concluding remarks
  • -
  • 4. Wireless network games
  • Noncooperative transmission scheduling in collision channels
  • The model and preliminaries
  • Equilibrium analysis
  • Achievable channel capacity
  • Best-response dynamics
  • Discussion
  • Noncooperative power control in collision channels
  • The model
  • Equilibrium analysis
  • Best-response dynamics and convergence to the power efficient equilibrium
  • Equilibrium (in)efficiency and Braess-like paradoxes
  • Discussion
  • Related work and extensions
  • Future directions
  • -
  • 5. Future perspectives
  • Bibliography
  • Authors' biographies.