http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Designing financial supervision institutions
independence, accountability and governance
Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor -- Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi -- The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup -- Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim Darbar and Alessandro Gambini -- Financial supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro -- Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini -- Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera -- Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine di Noia -- Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriette Prast and Donato Masciandaro -- Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini -- Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert Eisenbeis.
edited by Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn.
Includes bibliographical references and index.