rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: What's wrong with pain?
  name:
    name part: Shriver, Adam Joseph
    name part: 1978-
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Varner, Gary E.
    role:
      role term: thesis advisor.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: txu
    date issued: 2006
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: remote
  abstract: The experience of pain is something that most people are extremely familiar with. However, once we begin to examine the subject from an ethical point of view, and particularly when we examine so-called marginal cases such as nonhuman animals, we are quickly confronted with difficult questions. This thesis, through an examination of aparticular feature of moral language and a description of recent research on pain, provides an analysis of how pain fits into ethical theory. It is argued that universalizability is an important feature of ethical systems and provides a basis for claiming that an agent is acting inconsistently if he or she evaluates similar situations differently. Though the additional features prescriptivity and overridingness provide an important connection between moral judgment and action in Hare's two-level utilitarianism, it is argued that they ultimately lead to claims incompatible with lived moral experience. Arguments by Parfit and Sidgwick are discussed which tie acting morally to acting consistently, and it is concluded that self-interest theory is not a tenable position. After the features of moral judgment are discussed, the necessary features of a moral subject are examined. It is concluded that sentience, or the ability to feel pleasure or pain, is a sufficient condition for being a moral subject. Arguments are examined that attempt to show which animals likely consciously experience pain. Difficulties for these arguments are discussed and an original argument is presented that at least partially addresses these difficulties. It is concluded that from an ethical perspective our current practices such as factory farming are probably not justified. It appears especially likely that our treatment of other mammals is unethical, but the answers are not as clear with other animals. However, all of the conclusions are tentative, as no doubt future scientific investigation will shed more light on our knowledge.
  note: by Adam Joseph Shriver.
  note: "Major Subject: Philosophy"
  note: Title from author supplied metadata (automated record created on Feb. 23, 2007.)
  note: Vita.
  note: Abstract.
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  note: System requirements: World Wide Web access and Adobe Acrobat Reader.
  note: M. A. Texas A&M University 2005.
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  note: Text (Thesis).
  subject:
    topic: Major philosophy
  subject:
    topic: animal pain
  subject:
    topic: animal cognition
  subject:
    topic: animal welfare
  identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4285
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 070326
    record change date: 20151104163226.0
    record identifier: in00002222442