Capital controls and external debt term structure /
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| Format: | Thesis eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[College Station, Tex.] :
[Texas A&M University],
[2005]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to OAK Trust copy |
| Abstract: | In my dissertation, I explore the relationship between capital controls and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, incorporating explicitly the role of international lenders. I look at specific types of capital controls which take the form of date-specific and maturity-specific reserve requirements on external borrowing. I consider two questions: How is the maturity structure of external debt determined in a world general equilibrium? What are the effects of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements on the maturity structure of external debt? Can they prevent a bank run? I develop a simple Diamond-Dybvig-type model with three dates. In the low income countries, banks arise endogenously. There are two short-term bonds and one long -term bond offered by the domestic banks to international lenders. First I look at a simple model were international lending is modeled exogenously. I consider explicitly the maturity composition of capital inflows to a domestic economy. I show that the holdings of both short-term bonds are not differentiated according to date. Second, I consider international lending behavior explicitly. The world consists of two large open economies: one with high income and one with low income. The high income countries lend to low income countries. There exist multiple equilibria and some are characterized by relative price indeterminacy.Third, I discuss date-specific and maturity- specific reserve requirements. In my setup reserve requirements play the role of a tax and the role of providing liquidity for each bond at different dates. I show that they reduce the scope of indeterminacy. In some equilibria, I identify a case in which the reserve requirement rate on the long-term debt must be higher than that on the short-term debt for a tilt towards a longer maturity structure. Fourth, I introduce the possibility of an unexpected bank run. I show that some specific combination of date-and maturity-specific reserve requirements reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. With regard to the post-bank-run role of international lenders, I show that international lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to thebank after the occurrence of a bank run. |
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| Item Description: | "Major Subject: Economics" Title from author supplied metadata (automated record created on Nov. , 09:45:50.) Vita. Abstract. Electronic resource. |
| Format: | Mode of access: World Wide Web. System requirements: World Wide Web access and Adobe Acrobat Reader. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |