rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Conditional tests of corporate governance theories
  name:
    name part: Chi, Jianxin, 1973-
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Lee, D. Scott
    role:
      role term: thesis advisor.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: txu
    date issued: 2005
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: electronic
    form: remote
  abstract: Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are potentially more severe. However, empirical studies often do not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts. I show that the marginal benefit of governance varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts. As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying. This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). This study highlights the importance of controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism.
  note: by Jianxin Chi.
  note: "Major Subject: Finance"
  note: Title from author supplied metadata (automated record created on Sep. 21, 2005.)
  note: Vita.
  note: Abstract.
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  note: System requirements: World Wide Web access and Adobe Acrobat Reader.
  note: Ph. D. Texas A&M University 2005.
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  note: Text (Dissertation).
  subject:
    topic: Major finance
  subject:
    topic: fixed effects
  subject:
    topic: corporate governance
  subject:
    topic: Governance Index
  subject:
    topic: conditional
  subject:
    topic: agency
  identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2339
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 050928
    record change date: 20151102130532.0
    record identifier: in00002077868