Grounding intentionality /
In this thesis, I argue that current attempts to ground intentionality face one of two challenges. Either the grounding feature of intentionality will be itself intentional or the grounding feature is disparate in nature from the representational capacity of an intentional mental state and therefor...
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| Format: | Thesis eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
2004.
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| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy |
| Summary: | In this thesis, I argue that current attempts to ground intentionality face one of two challenges. Either the grounding feature of intentionality will be itself intentional or the grounding feature is disparate in nature from the representational capacity of an intentional mental state and therefore no connection between the two can be taken to exist. I examine two current accounts of intentionality and the features they utilize to ground it. I maintain that both views fall prey to one or both of the objections I raise. I conclude that any account of intentionality will need to meet both of these challenges in order to be counted successful. |
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| Item Description: | "Major subject: Philosophy". Vita. |
| Physical Description: | v, 38 leaves ; 28 cm. Also available online. Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (leaf 37). |