http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy
How constitutions affect democratic governance
Understanding the link between constitutions and individual attitudes has, by and large, been ignored in favor of focusing on the impact of specific institutional arrangements. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between theoretical expectations concerning the importance of constitutions and empirical work in the field. Beginning with Habermas' theory of discursive democracy, I analyze how constitutions affect both behavior (discourse) and individual levels of perceived regime legitimacy. Recent constitution drafting and implementation across Central and Eastern European countries provide a unique natural experiment to test hypotheses derived from normative theory. Findings suggest that constitutions impact both behavior and attitudes, but not in the way that Habermas predicted. While both the effective level of checks and balances and rule of law significantly impact the probability of political discourse, checks and balances decreases the probability while rule of law increases it. Further, guaranteed rights (necessary and non-necessary) actually decrease levels of perceived legitimacy. Interestingly, the inclusivity of the constitutional drafting and ratification processes appear to have no impact of perceived legitimacy. This points to a need to re-think constitutions as primarily positive, civic-culture building documents. Rather, individuals in new democracies react in a more complex fashion to these founding "moments".
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Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-147).