rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Leaving the corporate fold
    sub title: examining spin-off actions and performance
  name:
    name part: Semadeni, Matthew Briggs
    name part: 1969-
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Cannella, Albert A.
    role:
      role term: thesis advisor.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: txu
    date issued: 2003
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
  abstract: This research examines the exit of a subsidiary from its corporate parent through spin-off, the actions taken by the firm management post spin-off, and the performance implications of those actions, all from the spin-off's perspective. While spin-off announcements are generally met with a positive stock market reaction, what occurs post spin-off remains largely unexamined, with performance predictions regarding spin-off firms often being equivocal. This raises questions as to what generates positive performance for spin-off firms, with agency, transaction cost, and upper echelons theories offering differing, and sometimes conflicting, predictions. By integrating these theoretical perspectives, a model of managerial action and its performance implications is presented. The model examines how the formation of new top management, the establishment of managerial monitoring and incentives, and the severance effects from leaving the corporate structure affect strategic, financial, and institutional actions, and how these actions affect performance. The theory and hypotheses developed in this research are empirically tested on a sample of 176 corporate spin-offs completed by publicly traded firms between 1986 and 1997. Results for the action-based models indicate that background of the CEO or the TMT, as well as CEO options, had no effect on actions. CEO and TMT ownership had opposite effects on financial actions, with TMT ownership increasing the likelihood of strategic actions and CEO ownership increasing the likelihood of institutional actions. Ownership by the parent firm and monitoring by officers of the parent serving as board members had no effect on the likelihood of actions, although having a chairman of the board from the parent decreased the likelihood of strategic actions. Finally, severance effects had limited influence on the actions taken post spin-off. Results for the performance-based models indicate that strategic actions were negatively related to ROA, w…
  note: by Matthew Briggs Semadeni.
  note: "Major Subject: Management"
  note: Title from author supplied metadata.
  note: Electronic resource.
  note: Ph. D. Texas A & M University 2003.
  note: Includes bibliographical references.
  note: Text (Dissertation).
  subject:
    topic: Major management
  subject:
    topic: Spin-offs
  subject:
    topic: Management Actions
  subject:
    topic: Top Management
  subject:
    topic: Corporate Monitoring
  subject:
    topic: Management Incentives
  subject:
    topic: Severance Effects
  subject:
    topic: Performance
  identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/289
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 040225
    record change date: 20151026051335.0
    record identifier: in00001801362