Bribery between the bidders and the auctioneer in sealed-bid auctions /
Ordinarily in a first-price sealed-bid auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the highest bidder receives the item and pays his bid. In this standard framework, there is no distinction between the seller and the auctioneer. Realistically, though, the seller must hire an auctionee...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
2002.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=764774381&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | Ordinarily in a first-price sealed-bid auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the highest bidder receives the item and pays his bid. In this standard framework, there is no distinction between the seller and the auctioneer. Realistically, though, the seller must hire an auctioneer, leading to the possibility of corruption. In this dissertation, corruption takes the following form. The auctioneer approaches the bidders and tells them if they pay a bribe of a certain amount and if they submit the highest bid, the auctioneer will change their bid so that they only have to pay the second-highest bid. First, we study bribery between the auctioneer and bidders in a first-price auction and how it affects the bidding functions of the bidders and the welfare positions of the bidders, auctioneer and seller when it is common knowledge for bidders that the auctioneer is corrupt. We show that any bidder who pays the bribe bids his valuation and if a bidder does not pay the bribe and all the bidders with valuation less than his value do not pay the bribe, he bids his standard first-price bid. Second, we analyze bribery between the auctioneer and the bidders in a second-price auction. This time the proposed corruption does not work because the bidders' dominant strategy is to bid their values whatever the other bidders do. We show that seller can avoid transfer to the auctioneer by simply demanding a second-price auction. Third we study bribery between the auctioneer and bidders in a first-price auction in which there is a positive entry fee imposed by the seller. We show that another way for the seller to avoid the bribery is to use entry fee. The entry fee deters bribery in the sense that bidders with a smaller set of valuations pay the bribe. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Economics". |
| Physical Description: | ix, 69 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-68). |