Game-theoretic procedures for determining pavement thickness and traffic lane costs in highway cost allocation /
The objective of highway cost allocation (HCA) is to distribute in a fair and rational manner the construction, rehabilitation, maintenance, and other relevant costs for highway facilities (principally, pavements and bridges) among those vehicles using the facilities. In this dissertation, typical v...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
2002.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=764786171&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | The objective of highway cost allocation (HCA) is to distribute in a fair and rational manner the construction, rehabilitation, maintenance, and other relevant costs for highway facilities (principally, pavements and bridges) among those vehicles using the facilities. In this dissertation, typical vehicle classes will be grouped into classes such as passenger cars, trailer trucks, and buses. Furthermore, only traffic-related pavement costs will be considered. In most HCA studies, traffic-related highway costs are mainly distributed according to pavement thickness requirements (traffic load), without any consideration of highway capacity requirements. In this dissertation, a highway cost allocation method for considering both traffic capacity and traffic loads is developed. The proposed method is based on cooperative game theory, particularly two concepts known as the Aumann-Shapley (A-S) value and Shapley value. Both of the A-S value and the Shapley value are based on the average of the sum of the marginal costs for all possible ordered arrangements associated with a set of players. Each ESAL, each lane, or vehicle classes are considered as players in this dissertation. These values have the following desirable properties: (1) highway costs are fully paid by participating vehicle classes. (2) If any vehicle class does not contribute to any coalition, then the cost allocated to it is zero. (3) If the cost equation can be divided into two distinct and independent cost components, then the allocated costs can be divided into two corresponding components. Further, in several cases, it is proved or discussed in this dissertation on demand monotonicity for the Aumann-Shapley value that the cost-share of a vehicle class should not decrease when the vehicle class increases his demand (traffic). Cost allocations by several methods have been conducted using a set of real data. Even though traffic load seems to be a dominant factor for cost allocation over traffic capacity and environmental effects, the effect of traffic capacity is not small so that the proposed approach forces automobiles to be charged more and trailer trucks to be charged less than any other methods considered in this dissertation. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Industrial Engineering". |
| Physical Description: | xi, 126 leaves : illustrations, map ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 63-65). |