Corporate governance of family-controlled publicly-traded firms : the case of Taiwanese listed firms /
This study investigates the corporate governance of family-controlled public firms. Since most empirical literature on corporate control has focused on U.S. publicly traded firms and very few of them are family-controlled, very little is known about the governance of family- controlled public firms....
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1999.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=730303571&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | This study investigates the corporate governance of family-controlled public firms. Since most empirical literature on corporate control has focused on U.S. publicly traded firms and very few of them are family-controlled, very little is known about the governance of family- controlled public firms. Taiwanese firms are unique in that most of them are family-controlled yet publicly traded. I investigate the corporate agency problems prevalent in the market dominated by controlling shareholders and identify mechanisms providing monitoring of these controlling shareholders. My investigation of the Taiwanese corporate governance system provides evidence supporting the contribution of outside monitoring to firm value. Contrary to the anecdotal evidence, the close ties between the founding chairmen and the directors and supervisors does not adversely affect firm value. However, equity holdings of government agencies and the ruling political party impeded firm value. I also find that barks are not effective monitors. As in the U.S., insider ownership is found to have a weak non-linear relationship with firm value. Moreover, I find strong evidence that insider ownership is desirable in the market dominated by controlling shareholders, which raises questions to the expropriate hypothesis proposed by many scholars. I also find that most of my sample firms have not utilized the monitoring mechanisms to the optimal level. However, this is not the case for a small group of one-family controlled firms. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Finance". |
| Physical Description: | v, 56 leaves ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 40-43). |