On the animosity towards economic reform /
The notion that a large number of developing countries would benefit greatly if they were to undertake orthodox economic reforms stands pretty much uncontested in current economic thinking. What is left to wonder is why policymakers have met with so little success in their attempts to implement them...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1999.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=733509701&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | The notion that a large number of developing countries would benefit greatly if they were to undertake orthodox economic reforms stands pretty much uncontested in current economic thinking. What is left to wonder is why policymakers have met with so little success in their attempts to implement them. The economic literature has suggested a variety of mechanisms that make reform difficult to implement. While early work relied on myopic economic agents, more recent work has focused on the sub-optimal result that may emerge due to coordination failures or in the presence of uncertainty. In this dissertation we take a different approach, focusing on age as the driving force behind the decision of whether to support reform or to oppose it. We build a model of continuously overlapping finite-living identical workers where reform is defined as a permanent change in the wage structure comprising a simultaneous increase in the skilled wage and a fall in the unskilled wage. In our model acquiring skill is costly and labor is the only factor of production. Within this definition of reform, two polar types are considered. At one extreme, we consider a reform of the "now or never'' type and show that the reform proposal will drive a wedge between those who are young enough to benefit and those who are not. At the other extreme, we consider a proposal of the ''continuously offered'' type. We find that immediate majority support is not a necessary condition for its eventual approval, for a majority support can be amassed later on as alder workers are replaced. Doing so we find a rationale for delays in the implementation of economic reforms not yet explored by the literature. We encounter wage regions where multiple equilibria appear and discuss a possible welfare enhancing role for the government. In addition, we show that the model is qualitatively robust to changes in the rate of population growth and to the consideration of workers who care about the welfare of future generations. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Economics". |
| Physical Description: | vii, 49 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-40). |