http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Epistemology and the evaluation of archaeological theories
an empiricist approach, with a case study from the Mimbres region of Southwestern New Mexico
2 volumes : illustrations, maps ; 28 cm.
methodology in archaeology: what makes archaeological claims believable? Any methodology of archaeology is subservient to the methodology of induction. Empirical knowledge is inductive to its core, so determining whether archaeological inquiry produces something that counts as empirical knowledge means assessing the inductive soundness of the results. Theories are believable only inasmuch as they name plausible causes, and these causes cohere with evidence and stopping rules. The "available evidence rule'' underlies induction because we can only use what we have to establish empirical truths. "Stopping rules'' underlie induction because they are the background knowledge that shapes what counts as evidence or a cause. Theories lie along a continuum of believability amid bodies of evidence and background beliefs. Theories are metaphysical if their conclusions do not follow from causes. They are provisionally interesting if the causes are vague or the evidence sketchy. They become more interesting as causes become more clearly specified, or evidence more robust. They are continued when fair causal comparison shows that one provides a better causal account than its rivals. Consequently, theory evaluation reduces to two questions. "Are the stopping rules, evidence, and causes internally coherent?'' Regardless of method, a virtuous circle of induction must emerge. "How does this theory stack up against its rivals?'' Because theories cannot be tested against an unconceptualized world, the only thing left is to compare the causal world, the only thing left is to compare the causal comparison with an unconceptualized world, there is room for alternative theories even when there is no room for rivals. An examination of Minnis's (1985a) theory of Classic Mimbres collapse shows how a theory's believability depends on coherence between stopping rules, evidence, and causes. Minnis names population, climate, and inadequate food sharing networks as the causes of collapse, and constructs stopping rules serving as the theory's foundations. But, his stopping rules are arbitrary and cohere poorly at the foundational level. Irrelevant evidence undermines climate's causal adequacy. Twaddle about population growth rates undermines population's causal adequacy. Without climate and population as causes, food sharing networks have no explanatory work to do.
Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc.
Includes bibliographical references: pages 476-508.