Poison pills and compensation contracts /
I find evidence that poison pills allow boards of directors to structure more optimal pay packages. My results indicate that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance increases in firms that adopt bison pills relative to a control ample of firms that do not adopt a bison pill.. Of particular in...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1998.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=732820261&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | I find evidence that poison pills allow boards of directors to structure more optimal pay packages. My results indicate that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance increases in firms that adopt bison pills relative to a control ample of firms that do not adopt a bison pill.. Of particular interest is the change in the performance sensitivity of CEO pay associated with the pill adoption. Prior to the adoption of the pill, the pill firms have similar sensitivity of total pay to performance relative to a control ample. In addition, I and that firms that adopt poison pills tend to have more outsiders on the board before and after the pill adoption and that CEO ownership increases in pill firms after a pill adoption. I interpret my results as consistent with the ideas of DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Knaeber 1986) who argue that an antitakeover amendment such as a poison pill enhances the type of contracts shareholders can write and can lead to more efficient contract design. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. |
| Physical Description: | vii, 55 leaves ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilm Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references: pages 52-54. |