Corporate control and failure at publicly traded savings and loan associations /
This paper provides evidence that savings and loan association failures are related to internal corporate control mechanisms. The analysis is based on data for a sample of publicly traded institutions that cover the period 1983 through 1994. A multivariate model is used to control for differences...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1998.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=737688741&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | This paper provides evidence that savings and loan association failures are related to internal corporate control mechanisms. The analysis is based on data for a sample of publicly traded institutions that cover the period 1983 through 1994. A multivariate model is used to control for differences in firm size, firm age, type of charter, regional economic conditions, and asset and liability powers across states. I find evidence, similar to that reported in other studies that differentiate between inside, affiliated or grey, and independent outside directors, that the structure of savings and loan association boards was related to the survival of the institution. I also identify differences in the equity owned by directors, directors' tenure, and the compensation and tenure of CEOs betweenfailed and non-failed institutions. The boards of failed institutions included a smaller proportion of outside directors. These outside directors also owned less equity in failed institutions than they did in non-failed institutions. Grey directors, in addition to holding a greater proportion of board seats, also owned more equity in failed institutions. The CEOs of institutions that subsequently failed received a lower rate of pay for assets managed than their counterparts at non-failed institutions. On average, both the board and CEO remained in their positions for shorter periods of time at failed than they did at non-failed institutions. These findings suggest that agency problems between the managers and shareholders of publicly traded savings institutions should be incorporated into a complete examination of the S&L crisis. Explanations of the S&L crisis that ignore issues such as board structure and tenure, equity ownership, and the tenure and compensation of CEOs are, therefore, incomplete. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Finance". |
| Physical Description: | xi, 106 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilms Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references: pages 86-90. |