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democracy and clientelism in South Korea and Taiwan
ix, 203 leaves : illustrations, maps ; 28 cm.
While recent studies of democratic transition and consolidation assume a complementarity between democracy and uncertainty, the persisting utilization of client- patron relationships threatens the continued entrenchment of democratic rule. Studies of the outcomes of democratic transition frequently focus on the quality of political institutions such as legislatures and political parties and omen fail to address questions dealing with the influence of less formal institutions on the democratic nature of policy outcomes. Clientelistic by individuals and parties skirt these formal institutions of rule and undermine the standard of fair competition. By examining South Korea and Taiwan prior to and after democratic transition, we address the major theoretical question posed in this dissertation, "What difference democracy?''. Has democratization restricted or merely altered the nature of the tools available to ruling parties for influencing political outcomes at the mass level? This dissertation introduces and elaborates on a new variant of clientelism, mass clientelism, and seeks to understand the trajectory of its development from authoritarianism through democratization. While essentially the same type of exchange relationship as traditional clientelism, mass clientelism is explicitly aimed at an aggregate group of voters at the district level. Data for this project have been gathered from primary sources for each case covering the period from 1980 - 1995 for sub-national units in South Korea and Taiwan. This data includes budget and electoral documents as well as interviews conducted in Taiwan during the Spring of 1996. The time period for each country is divided into appropriate panels that reflect different periods of political development. Hypotheses are then tested in each panel by pooled time series constant coefficient regressions. Findings show that democracy has not limited the utilization of mass clientelism and, in fact, the strongest correlation between partisanship and clientage at the constituency level is present in the most recent and most democratic panels in both cases. Ruling parties are relying on traditional clientelistic behavior for decreasing their own levels of uncertainty at the expense of fair and public competition for public resources.
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Includes bibliographical references: pages 162-171.