The effects of differing vertical exchange mechanisms on United States trade in high-value agricultural products : a game theoretic analysis /
In recent years, high-value agricultural products have become an important topic of research as the United States has actively worked towards increasing the share of these products in its agricultural export mix. The U.S. food processing industry, a major purveyor of high-value agricultural product...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1996.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=739653131&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | In recent years, high-value agricultural products have become an important topic of research as the United States has actively worked towards increasing the share of these products in its agricultural export mix. The U.S. food processing industry, a major purveyor of high-value agricultural product exports, is generally comprised of two classes of firms: ingredient processors and food manufacturers. Four-firm concentration ratios for both ingredient processors, as well as, food manufacturers have steadily increased during the last two decades. This fact would indicate that there exists potential for oligopolistic interaction between ingredient processors and food manufacturers, as well as, between food manufacturers and terminal domestic and export markets. A number of vertical exchange mechanisms exist to coordinate the transfer of basic food ingredients between ingredient processors and food manufacturers. These various vertical exchange mechanisms range from full external coordination (spot markets) at one extreme to contractual arrangements to fun internal coordination (vertical integration) at the other extreme. Over the past several decades, tighter vertical control (i.e. evolution away from spot markets towards contractual and vertically integrated exchange mechanisms) has been steadily increasing between U. S. ingredient processors and U. S. food manufacturers. Given this trend, a logical question arose as to their possible impacts upon the nature of U.S. trade in highly-processed, high-value agricultural products. To this end, five game theoretic scenarios were solved and discussed. These scenarios differed by the degree of vertical relations between ingredient processors and food manufacturers. The Nash equilibrium found under these scenarios were then used to develop propositions that revealed the impacts of these differing vertical exchange mechanisms upon U.S. trade in high-value agricultural products. Results indicated that vertical integration was the most advantageous vertical form between ingredient processors and food manufacturers in terms of profit level and market share associated with U.S. exports of high-value agricultural products. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Agricultural Economics". |
| Physical Description: | xii, 118 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilms Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references: pages 115-118. |