Intervention or interference : an examination of the new rules governing managerial compensation /
An important question in the corporate governance debate is the role that compensation committees play in setting executive pay. In this study, I investigate the implications of government intervention into the executive pay process using a panel of CEO pay data between 1985 and 1994. My main find...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1996.
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| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=739623541&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | An important question in the corporate governance debate is the role that compensation committees play in setting executive pay. In this study, I investigate the implications of government intervention into the executive pay process using a panel of CEO pay data between 1985 and 1994. My main findings are; first, CEOs serving on their own compensation committees do not act opportunistically. To the contrary, these CEOs have their economic interests closely aligned with the interests of their shareholders. Second, 'independent directors are associated with stronger pay-for-performance sensitivities. However, this is only relative to affiliated directors. Third, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities have become stronger through time. However, the improvement in sensitivities preceded the introduction of government regulations. Overall, these findings suggest that the new regulations do not improve managers' incentives to maximize firm value. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Finance". |
| Physical Description: | v, 67 leaves ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilms Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references: pages 52-53. |