http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Communication and group identity in a public goods dilemma
viii, 81 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm.
as expected. Cooperation rates did not differ between levels
communication and group identity. Results support Kerr and
communication, group identity, and share size on cooperation
groups cooperated more than no discussion groups, cooperation
increased with increased share size, and there was a
Kaufman-Gilliland's (1994) position that commitments, rather
of 5. Three of the five hypotheses were supported: Discussion
of group identity, and rio interaction occurred between
played by 265 undergraduate students participating in groups
rates in a public goods dilemma. An investment game was
significant interaction between communication and share size,
than group identity, explain communication's effect on
The present study examined the relationship between
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