Communication and group identity in a public goods dilemma /
as expected. Cooperation rates did not differ between levels
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Thesis eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1996.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy |
| Summary: | as expected. Cooperation rates did not differ between levels communication and group identity. Results support Kerr and communication, group identity, and share size on cooperation cooperation. groups cooperated more than no discussion groups, cooperation increased with increased share size, and there was a Kaufman-Gilliland's (1994) position that commitments, rather of 5. Three of the five hypotheses were supported: Discussion of group identity, and rio interaction occurred between played by 265 undergraduate students participating in groups rates in a public goods dilemma. An investment game was significant interaction between communication and share size, than group identity, explain communication's effect on The present study examined the relationship between |
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| Item Description: | "Major subject: Psychology". Vita. |
| Physical Description: | viii, 81 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Also available online. Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |