Moral hazard in health care consumption under asymmetric information /
This dissertation extends previous research on moral hazard. I develop the model for the effect of insurance, opportunity cost, and initial wealth on taking care. Specifically I analyze how different forms of health insurance can affect the amount of preventive measures, precaution, or 'Taking...
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1996.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=743149211&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | This dissertation extends previous research on moral hazard. I develop the model for the effect of insurance, opportunity cost, and initial wealth on taking care. Specifically I analyze how different forms of health insurance can affect the amount of preventive measures, precaution, or 'Taking care" an insured individual undertakes in order to reduce the probability of illness under asymmetric information. In case of the non money measurable taking care, the theoretical results indicate a positive relationship between taking care and insurance variables, such as coinsurance rate and maximum out-of-pocket expenditure. However, in case of the money measurable taking care, the results are ambiguous. These results are empirically tested by using EIIE data from Rand. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Economics". |
| Physical Description: | ix, 175 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilms Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |