Essays on the agenda-setter model /
In the public finance literature, the median voter model is
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| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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[Place of publication not identified] :
[publisher not identified] ;
1995.
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| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=741213491&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=2945&RQT=309&VName=PQD |
| Summary: | In the public finance literature, the median voter model is ubiquitous for modeling collective decisions. A strong theoretical alternative is the agenda-setter model. This model explicitly builds in key institutional details such as the rules of the referendum process. Bureaucrats are assumed to pursue their own agenda and not respond passively to changes in demand. Despite its richer theoretical construction, the agenda-setter model has not performed well empirically. Attempts to differentiate it from the median voter model have failed to garner any empirical support. When the reversion level is included in an econometric specification, its coefficient has had the opposite sign predicted by the theory. This dissertation theoretically develops the agenda-setter model. It is shown that the observed elasticities will be systematically more elastic than that of the median or pivotal voter. Furthermore, in addition to its negative effect on expenditure levels, increases in the reversion level has a positive effect on absolute price and income elasticities. This fundamental extension of the model provides additional testable implications, imposes restrictions on the econometric specification, and has public policy implications. A second issue dealt with is the econometric specification. From the aforementioned theoretical work, it is shown that previous specifications and tests of the model are inadequate. In this dissertation, the specification developed allows for the reversion level's inverse effect on expenditures a long with its positive effect on the price and income coefficients. This lays the groundwork for an appropriate empirical test using data from the state of Oregon. The dissertation also develops a differentiating test of the models from an entirely new perspective. All previous research in this area has attempted to distinguish the models via the demand equation of school districts. However, for a specific institutional framework, each model has different predictions for the observed distribution of expenditures across districts within a state. The key institutional development that produces this test is state subsidization institutions that produce kinked budget constraints of voters. The median voter model implies a number of districts should stick at each kink, whereas the agenda-setter model implies no such stickiness. |
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| Item Description: | Vita. "Major Subject: Economics". |
| Physical Description: | xiii, 147 leaves : illustrations ; 28 cm. Issued also on microfiche from University Microfilms Inc. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |