Market structure, compensation and incentives : an empirical analysis of CEO compensation /
| Main Author: | |
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| Other Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
1991.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy |
| Abstract: | The incentive contracts written between owners and managers have long been studied by economists and compensation boards. Researchers have attempted to identify the relationship between compensation, profits and sales. These efforts have produced a plethora of results. Economists have found that the relationship between sales and compensation will be a function of the structure of the market in which firms are competing. This dissertation tests the robustness of linear estimates of incentives to changes in econometric specifications, and tests the restrictions imposed. Estimates of the terms of incentive contracts based on the market structure model of executive compensation are computed and reported. The results of this research indicate that CEO compensation contracts are dynamic, and the affects of sales on compensation differs significantly across firms. In addition, the results suggest that the affects of firm performance on CEO compensation also varies across firms. |
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| Item Description: | Typescript (photocopy). Vita. "Major subject: Economics." |
| Physical Description: | ix, 167 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |