John Foster Dulles and the 1954 United States-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement /
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| Other Authors: | , , , , |
| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
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1989.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy |
| Abstract: | In May 1954 the United States concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. American policymakers believed that a military buildup of Pakistan would help to deter Soviet expansion into the Near East and South Asia and point up the merits of collective security as opposed to Indian nonalignment. Pakistan's strategic utility, however, was illusory, the Soviet threat was exaggerated, and the alliance exacerbated regional tensions and reinforced Indian determination to act unilaterally. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles played a critical role in the conception, negotiation, and conclusion of the 1954 agreement, and his attitudes and preconceptions were crucial to his support of the alliance. Dulles, as of early 1953, believed that the Soviet Union, driven by ideological, historical, and especially geopolitical considerations, was intent on expansion into the Near East and South Asia. To prevent Soviet acquisition of these areas the West needed to build up regional defenses. Pakistan, he felt, possessed the required mix of strategic location, military assets and pro-Western attitude to serve as an anchor of regional defense. India, in his view, was a state with naive, communist leaning leaders who pursued a dangerous neutralist policy. These views clouded Dulles's ability to assess threats and interests, caused him to reject evidence that the alliance was of marginal utility, and led him to pursue a flawed strategic conception, the "northern tier" theory. In the end, he supported the alliance as much to prevent an Indian political victory as to contain Soviet expansion. The significance of this study lies, first, in its examination of Dulles's views on strategy and on India and Pakistan. Second, it establishes the central role preconceptions played in determining Dulles's endorsement of the agreement. Third, it points up the flaws in the geostrategic approach that has dominated American security planning in the under developed world since 1945. |
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| Item Description: | Typescript (photocopy). Vita. "Major subject: History." |
| Physical Description: | vi, 197 leaves ; 29 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |