http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Towards a theory of the role of the public sector audit as a monitoring device
a test using Texas independent school districts
This dissertation investigated the role of the public sector audit as a monitoring device in the political environment in which bureaucratic agents and their sponsors interact. The primary objectives of the study were to determine: (1) whether the audit provides evidence of control over information being exercised by bureaucrats, and (2) how the level of auditing demanded is affected by the presence of competing control mechanisms. The research project used information pertaining to 202 independent school districts in Texas. These districts were split into two samples, the largest 102 districts and a random sample of 100 districts. Ordinary least-squares regression models were performed to statistically analyze the relationships between: (1) the level of school district expenditures and factors modeled to represent a profile of the "median voter", (2) budget and staffing preferences and measures of fiscal, information, and audit complexity, (3) expenditures, the "median voter" profile and proxies for bureaucratic influence, and (4) 1986 audit fees and competing control mechanisms. The major results of the study indicated that (1) bureaucratic influence is consistently exhibited in the sample of the large school districts, (2) for large school districts the level of audit demanded is affected by the presence of competing control mechanisms, and (3) the results, generally, do not hold for small school districts.