Collusive behavior in experimental oligopoly markets /
| Main Author: | |
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| Other Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Thesis Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
1988.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to OAKTrust copy |
| Abstract: | This dissertation examines the differences in experimental two person matrix games and four person matrix games. Experimental methods were used to test the differences in two person matrix games that exhibit collusive behavior and four person matrix games that have previously not exhibited collusive behavior. All the experiments run were in games with either two or four participants. The addition of complete monitoring, the ability to send a specific punishment and the testing of how history of past experiences may affect current behavior were all part of the experimental design. Several hypotheses were tested including the following. H1. Complete monitoring favors the appearance of collusive behavior. H2. The ability to send a specific punishment by each participant encourages collusive outcomes in a four person matrix game. H3. The effect of history can sometimes override traditional market forces. The data reject the first hypothesis and confirm hypotheses 2 and 3. Collusion is not observed in any four person games when the ability of a specific punishment is not presently available or has not previously been available to the participants. |
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| Item Description: | Typescript (photocopy). Vita. "Major subject: Economics." |
| Physical Description: | x, 166 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |