rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Durability and market organization under uncertainty
  name:
    name part: Seo, Ok Seok.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Dahm, P. Fred
    role:
      role term: degree committee member.
  name:
    name part: Hwang, Hae-Shin
    role:
      role term: degree committee member.
  name:
    name part: Maurice, S. Charles
    role:
      role term: degree committee member.
  name:
    name part: Saving, Thomas R.
    role:
      role term: degree supervisor.
  name:
    name part: Texas A & M University
    role:
      role term: degree granting institution.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Academic theses
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: xx
    date issued: 1986
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: print
    extent: vii, 97 leaves : illustrations ; 29 cm
  abstract: In the past two decades, there has been great controversy in theoretical discussions on the effect of market organization on the durability of durable goods. Modern view is one where both a monopolist and a competitive industry choose the same durability and thus durability is independent of market organization. This dissertation analyzes the effect of market organization on durability by relaxing the crucial assumption of perfect substitutability among durable goods with different durability. When durable goods have a stochastic nature in their durability, risk-averse consumers are not indifferent among durable goods with different mean durability since they are imperfect substitutes for each other with respect to the risk level. The consumers find the optimal mean durability which minimizes risk when they purchase durable goods. Firms have to choose the durability level of durable goods given the existence of consumers' demand for mean durability. This dissertation shows that Swan's independence result holds only when both consumers and firms are risk neutral. The level of durability chosen under this situation minimizes the cost of providing service flow. However, when consumers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral, Swan's independence result does not hold even under constant returns to scale. A monopolist makes goods more durable than does a competitive industry when consumers reveal a negative value on the marginal increase in mean durability. This result is strikingly different from the traditional view and from Swan's independence result. On the other hand, when consumers impose a positive value on the marginal increase in mean durability, a competitive industry will make goods more durable than would a monopolist. This result is consistent with the traditional view. In both cases a competitive industry chooses more wants-satisfying durability. These levels of durability are different from Swan's independence result. This adverse selection of durability…
  note: Typescript (photocopy).
  note: Vita.
  note: Ph. D. in Economics Texas A & M University 1986
  note: Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-96).
  subject:
    topic: Consumption (Economics)
  subject:
    topic: Durable goods, Consumer
  subject:
    topic: Industrial concentration
  subject:
    topic: Major economics
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  identifier: https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/DISSERTATIONS-24852
  related item:
    location:
      url: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  related item:
    location:
      url: https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/DISSERTATIONS-24852
  record info:
    record content source: TXA
    record creation date: 880616
    record change date: 20220104090745.0
    record identifier: in00000016882
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng