http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
agency theory analysis of corporate lobbying in response to the discussion memorandum on accounting for income taxes
This study draws upon agency theory and the results of previous empirical research to suggest (1) a model to explain managers' preferences for alternative methods of allocating income taxes; (2) a model to explain managers' preferences for methods of accounting for the investment tax credit; and (3) a model to explain when managers lobby with the FASB. Managers' preferences for accounting methods and their lobbying behavior were determined by analyzing responses to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on Accounting for Income Taxes. The results provide some support for agency theory variables being a factor in managers' lobbying decisions. However, the results suggest that information costs may dominate in managers' preferences for accounting methods and size may dominate in managers' decision whether to lobby.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).