An agency theory analysis of corporate lobbying in response to the discussion memorandum on accounting for income taxes /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Carpenter, Janice Lee
Other Authors:	Addy, Noel (degree committee member.), Cooper, Kerry (degree committee member.), Wehrly, Thomas (degree committee member.)
Format:	Thesis Book
Language:	English
Published:	1986.
Subjects:	Corporations > Taxation > United States. Income tax > United States > Accounting. Lobbying. Major accounting. Corporations > Taxation. Income tax > Accounting. United States. Academic theses
Online Access:	Link to ProQuest copy Link to OAKTrust copy ProQuest, Abstract

Description
Abstract:	This study draws upon agency theory and the results of previous empirical research to suggest (1) a model to explain managers' preferences for alternative methods of allocating income taxes; (2) a model to explain managers' preferences for methods of accounting for the investment tax credit; and (3) a model to explain when managers lobby with the FASB. Managers' preferences for accounting methods and their lobbying behavior were determined by analyzing responses to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on Accounting for Income Taxes. The results provide some support for agency theory variables being a factor in managers' lobbying decisions. However, the results suggest that information costs may dominate in managers' preferences for accounting methods and size may dominate in managers' decision whether to lobby.
Item Description:	"Major subject: Accounting." Typescript (photocopy). Vita.
Physical Description:	vii, 66 leaves (1 folded) ; 29 cm
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).